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This paper presents a model of stochastic growth in which the probability of adverse
shocks to production is inversely related to the aggregate stock of capital per capita.
Postulating this endogenous relationship, justied by empirical evidence, the model
yields long-run predictions consistent with the recent ndings of cross-country club
convergence and intra-distribution mobility.
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This paper develops a model of growth with stochastic production. On the basis of
observable empirical regularities, it postulates that the probability of adverse pro-
duction shocks decreases as an economy advances to higher stages of development,
proxied by the accumulated stock of capital. This is a departure from standard
stochastic growth models, where the randomness in production is customarily taken
as exogenous and invariant with respect to the level of accumulated capital. Endoge-
nizing the probability distribution over the shocks permits the identication of a rich
variety of dynamic equilibria, characterized by dierent shapes of the long-run, sta-
tionary distribution of capital per capita. This makes it possible to predict a number
of observable empirical phenomena, such as `club convergence', `economic miracles',
`growth disasters' and `reversals of fortune'.
The most recent empirical growth literature has debated the importance of the
analysis of distribution dynamics for a full understanding of the mechanics of economic
development. This view is strongly supported by Quah in numerous contributions
(e.g. Quah [30], [31], [32], [33], [34]).1 Empirical studies have shown consistent
evidence of a cross-country income distribution displaying bimodality with a marked
thinning in the middle.2 Countries are clustered in two separate groups, the rich
and the poor. However, there is a positive probability for an economy to move from
one cluster to the other, that is, the bimodal distribution is ergodic. These results
are interpreted as showing a lack of convergence among rich and poor countries,
although it is possible to observe at times economic miracles, or previously poor
economies that grow rapidly and move to join the rich club, as well as reversals of
fortune, where the spells of fast growth are only temporary and are followed by abrupt
halts and decumulation, and nally, economic disasters, i.e. previously rich economies
1The \classical" approach to the study of cross-sectional growth patterns originally analyzed
the properties of the rst and the second moment of the cross-country distribution, investigating
the existence of the so-called -convergence and -convergence (e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin [5],
Mankiw, Romer and Weil [26]). Subsequently, much energy has been spent in a (perhaps at times
overheated) dispute among those attacking the validity of this approach and those in its defense.
The essence of the controversy is best captured in the contributions of Durlauf [18], Bernard and
Jones [10], Sala-i-Martin [38], Quah [32] and Galor [20].
2In addition to Quah's contribution see also Ben-David [8], Benhabib and Gali [9] and Bianchi
[13].
1regressing to signicantly lower levels of income.3
An important issue in this debate is related to the choice of the appropriate
theoretical model which can predict club convergence and explain the occurrence
of the above mentioned intra-distribution dynamics. Part of the research eort has
been directed at analyzing whether such phenomena can be described in the world of
diminishing marginal productivity and constant returns to scale of the neo-classical
growth model. Galor [20] maintains that club convergence can still be predicted
by such model once we `augment' it by introducing individual heterogeneity, human
capital accumulation, capital market imperfections, endogenous fertilities, etc.4 Any
one of these more sophisticated versions of the model can generate multiplicity of
steady states: club convergence is generated as the result of history dependence.
Nonetheless, two important caveats should be highlighted. First, the model predicts
that \countries with similar structural characteristics converge to the same steady-
state equilibrium if their initial per capita output levels are similar as well" (Galor
[20], pag. 1058, emphasis is mine). However, two identical countries with very close
initial conditions still converge to separate steady-state equilibria if they start on
dierent sides of an unstable steady-state equilibrium.5 Thus, empirically it may be
dicult to predict the future development path of two identical countries from the
observation of similar initial per capita output levels.6 The second and perhaps more
important criticism is that the standard deterministic growth model yields incorrect
predictions on the intra-distribution dynamics: the kind of club convergence generated
through multiplicity implies that a country will never leave its basin of attraction. Put
dierently, contrary to the above mentioned empirical ndings, the model predicts a
3Examples of economic miracles might be Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan,
although recent events may suggest that for some of them the concept of reversals of fortune is a
more apt description. As for economic disasters, oft cited examples are Argentina, one of the richest
economies in the rst part of this century but with a per capita income in 1988 only 42 percent of
that of the United States, and Venezuela, the third richest country in 1960 with a 1988 income only
55 percent of that of the United States (Jones [25]).
4Examples of such models are Galor and Zeira [24], Azariadis and Drazen [3], Galor and Tsiddon
[22], Barro and Becker [4], Galor and Weil [23]. A thourough survey of such models is in Azariadis
[2].
5This arbitrariness is recognized by Galor himself ([20], pag. 1058, footnote 6).
6In fact, in the presentation of the results of this paper I will actually argue that relying on the
similarity of initial conditions in per capita output is not only ambiguous but perhaps altogether
misleading.
2non-ergodic bimodal distribution.7
Given the necessity of investigating distributional properties and asking questions
in probabilistic terms, could the stochastic version of the neo-classical growth model
be a more appropriate theoretical framework?8 In a growth model with stochastic
production the long-run equilibrium is characterized by a stationary distribution of per
capita income levels. Cross-sectional and time-series predictions compatible with the
above mentioned stylized facts emerge naturally. However, a major caveat associated
with standard stochastic growth models is that the randomness in production is
exogenously imposed: the distributional patterns derived by the model are completely
`nature driven', and this makes it hard to extract explanatory power from the model.9
Another problem is that by imposing exogenous randomness, one is lead to predict a
similar pattern of uncertainty for all economies, regardless of the level of per capita
output. This implies that output variability must be the same for both developing
and developed economies. However, there is strong evidence of a much higher output
variability in developing countries (see e.g. Acemoglu and Zilibotti [1] and Ramey
and Ramey [35]).
The model presented in this paper renes the neoclassical, stochastic growth model
by postulating that the likelihood of adverse shocks to production is higher when an
economy is in early stages of development. There are plausible economic explanations
to justify such a postulate. A developing economy is likely to suer from the inexis-
tence of markets to insure production risk. Lack of infrastructures and other institu-
tional factors may hinder diversication (e.g. Chile and its former heavy dependence
on copper production). Also, there may be a higher vulnerability to internationally
driven shocks (foreign direct investment withdrawal, currency shocks, etc.). This
endogenous relationship between the probability of an economic setback and aggre-
7This remark is also made by Benhabib and Gali [9].
8The origin of this alternative theoretical model is usually attributed to the contribution of Brock
and Mirman [14]. See also Mirman [27], Mirman and Zilcha [28], Zilcha [40]. Also Wang [41], [42],
Bertocchi [11] for the extension to the overlapping generations framework.
9In other words, the model predicts that the exact position within the stationary distribution is
purely determined by `luck'. It should be fair to note that the standard stochastic growth model was
originally investigated simply to conrm the basic predictions of the deterministic version, that is to
make sure that the deterministic equilibrium was robust to stochastic perturbations (see Brock and
Mirman [14], pag. 480). Thus its importance is not diminished by the fact that it cannot answers
more sophisticated questions.
3gate capital per capita has actually been derived from rst principles by Acemoglu
and Zilibotti [1]. Their explanation is indeed based on market incompleteness and
lack of diversication. While their model is important in that it shows a convincing
mechanism generating such an inverse relationship, it does not focus on the issues of
interest to this paper.10 The postulated relationship in this paper is a reduced form
representation of the Acemoglu and Zilibotti's rst principles derivation.
In any event, there is empirical conrmation that an economic setback is more
likely at lower levels of development. Quah [30] estimated a cross-country transition
matrix of income per capita to analyze patterns of persistence and intra-distribution
dynamics. Such a matrix (shown in Table 1 and extensively analyzed throughout the
paper) indeed shows that the probability to drop in the income ranking is higher for
countries with lower levels of income. This empirical evidence thus suggests (and the
model would like to capture) an intrinsic higher frailty of countries at early stages of
development.
How can this innovation in the standard stochastic growth model generate club
convergence? At low stages of development, an economy is not only characterized
by low capital but also by a low probability that that capital will be successful in
production. This generates time persistence in the poverty region. An attempt to
merely accelerate capital accumulation (e.g. policies increasing savings rate) may still
be a failure. In turn, at high stages of development not only capital accumulation is
high, but also the probability of success is high, generating time persistence in the
developed region. `Some' degree of fate{or, more interesting, policies aecting, for
instance, the degree of diversication and of market incompleteness{are such that
economies will transit from one region to the other, allowing for the observable intra-
distribution mobility.11
10In fact their model would yield very strong predictions as far as the convergence debate goes:
the stationary distribution in their model is unimodal (it is in fact a collapsed distribution on one
steady-state value of capital per capita), and all economies are ultimately expected to converge with
each other.
11The importance of `luck' as a factor determining cross-country growth patterns, has been ana-
lyzed in Easterly et al. [19]. The authors actually argue that luck is perhaps the main explanation
for the instances of economic miracles observed over time. In my model, luck is only a factor aecting
the timing of intra-distribution mobility, since the postulated relationship between the probability
of adverse shocks and aggregate capital still underlines the importance of economic, institutional
factors responsible for its characteristics.
4This paper contributes to the growth literature in dierent ways. First, the paper
conrms the neoclassical model as an adequate framework of analysis for economic
development. Second, it highlights the importance of uncertainty in economic devel-
opment. It suggests that capital accumulation per se is a necessary but not a sucient
condition for permanent development, and that more attention should be devoted to
policies specically aimed at reducing the impact of adverse shocks. Third, it con-
tributes to the convergence debate by identifying the conditions for the emergence of
club convergence without having to rely on multiplicity of steady states. Moreover,
the stationary distributions are ergodic, allowing for intra-distribution mobility.
Finally, the paper contributes to that stream of literature which oers, as an alter-
native explanation for these empirical ndings, the possibility that equilibrium inde-
terminacy be a proper characterization of reality. Among others, still Benhabib and
Gali [9] suggest that in the presence of technological complementarities, it is possible
that more than one pair of expectations/outcomes are consistent with individuals'
optimization. Failing to coordinate agents' expectations results in equilibrium inde-
terminacy. In fact, the endogenous relationship postulated in this paper is a type of
technological complementarity and indeed equilibrium indeterminacy may emerge in
the model. The paper shows under what conditions on the primitives this is likely
to happen, but subsequently it shows that club convergence and intra-distribution
mobility are identiable even in the absence of indeterminacy.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 I lay out the details of the model.
Section 3 analyzes the dynamic equilibrium and the potential emergence of equi-
librium indeterminacy and its interpretation as a rst result of permanent income
disparity. The paper continues focusing on the dynamic in the case in which indeter-
minacy does not emerge. Section 4 describes the nature of the stationary equilibria
of the economy, identifying potential causes for club convergence and the likelihood
of economic miracles, disasters and reversals of fortune, in the absence of both in-
determinacy and multiplicity of equilibria. Section 5 presents numerical simulations
calibrated on Quah's empirical ndings. The simulations help visualizing a stationary
distribution and show how its shape is aected by the choice of parameters of the
function representing the probability of an economic setback. Section 6 presents a
summary and concluding remarks.
52 The economy
The model is based on the stochastic extension of the Diamond [16] overlapping gen-
erations economy with production. The economy is populated by cohorts of identical
agents living for two periods. Population size is assumed to be constant and without
loss of generality normalized to one.
Agents derive utility from consumption in both periods of a single, non-storable
good, produced with a constant returns to scale production function. Production is
subject in every period to an exogenous, multiplicative random shock, whose charac-
teristics are fully described in the next section. There is full depreciation of capital.
2.1 Technology
The production technology is described by the general functional form Yt = F(Kt;L t)t,
where Yt;K t and Lt denote output, capital and labor, respectively, at time t. t is a
random variable which can take two values, 0 < L < H = 1. Therefore, in every pe-
riod there is a positive probability the economy loses capital and drop down the income
ranking. It is assumed for simplicity that L
t = L and H
t = H; 8t. The function
F(;) is assumed homogeneous of degree one in Kt and Lt. Therefore, putting all
variables in per-capita terms, yt = f(kt)t,w h e r ef() is the per-capita production
function. In addition, f 2 C2;f (0) = 0;f 0(k) > 0;f 00(k) < 0; 8k  0: Finally, to




f0(k)=0 ,a r e
satised.
I conjecture the existence of an economy-wide capital accumulation externality,
such that as the economy reaches more advanced stages of development, proxied by
its stock of accumulated capital, the likelihood of an economic setback decreases. In
introduction I have provided economic arguments to justify this conjecture, but its
plausibility seems indeed conrmed on empirical ground. Table 1 is taken from Quah
[30], pag. 431. It describes a 23-year Markov chain transition matrix of per capita
incomes for a sample of 118 countries. Each country's per capita income is calculated
relative to the world average.
According to the table, an economy with income more than twice as high as the
world average, has a 0.05 probability to drop down to lower levels. In my model this
is equivalent to saying that the probability of L is 0.05 when an economy is at the
6highest stages of development. Continuing the analysis of the table, the probability
to drop down for an economy with income between once and twice the world average
is instead 0.24. Proceeding down the income ranking this probability increases until it
reaches 0.76 for economies at the bottom rank. This is empirical evidence conrming
the conjectured endogenous relationship between the probability of adverse shocks to
production and the accumulated capital stock. Based on these empirical ndings I
postulate that
pt = p(kt); (1)
where pt  Pr(t = H); and p(0)  0;p 0(k) > 0a n dp00(k)
S 0. Also, it is assumed
that 9  k<1;s : t :p ( k)=1 ; 8k   k: This last assumption is discussed later in
section 4.2.
In a recent contribution, Acemoglu and Zilibotti [1] derive an expression like (1) as
a result of market incompleteness and lack of production dierentiation. An impor-
tant aspect of their model is that the authors generate this endogenous relationship
from rst principles. However, the price to pay to allow full tractability are quite
substantial restrictions on the primitives.12 Instead, by postulating such relationship,
justied on empirical ground, I can maintain a higher degree of generality and work
with very general expressions for technology, preferences and the function p(k). This
allows me to identify a broader class of dynamic equilibria, and highlight several
instances of multiplicity and poverty traps, thus extending and complementing Ace-
moglu and Zilibotti's results.13 Many comparisons with their paper will be drawn
throughout the following sections. Thus in what follows, equation 1 could be seen as
a reduced form representation of Acemoglu and Zilibotti's model.
12In their model intermediate goods are produced with linear technologies, the nal good with a
Cobb-Douglas, and preferences are logaritmic. Also, they construct the model so that the probability
of success increases linearly in k:
13For example, as we will see in following sections, by not restricting preferences to be logaritmic,
it is possible to identify potential equilibrium indeterminacy, shown to depend on the preferences'
degree of risk aversion.
72.2 Preferences
Agents maximize a von Neumann-Morgenstern, time-separable, expected utility func-
tion over consumption in both periods, U = v(ct)+Etu(ct+1): We assume that v;u 2






At the end of time t, young agents, who have worked and received wage income
!t(t), decide on the optimal amount of savings, st, necessary to nance consumption
in period t +1 .




ct + st = !t(t);
ct+1 = st^ rt+1(t+1);
where ^ rt+1 is the expected rate of return on savings, whose randomness depends on the
probability distribution governing the shock t+1. Note that at the time the problem
is solved, the wage income, function of the random shock at time t,i sk n o w n .
3 The dynamic equilibrium
Denote as s
t =a r gm a x fv[!t(t) −st]+Etu[st^ rt+1(t+1)]g . The optimal amount of
savings at time t is the supply of capital at time t + 1 available to rms.
Firms are assumed to be prot maximizers and in perfect competition among each
other for the supply of capital s
t (and labor of generation t+1). Prot maximization
and perfect competition ensure that factors will be priced according to their marginal
contribution to production, i.e.
rt+1 = f
0(kt+1)t+1; (3)
!t+1 =[ f(kt+1) − kt+1f
0(kt+1)]t+1; (4)
Agents of generation t solve the maximization problem in (2). The rst order condi-
8tion is
v
0[!t(t) − st]=Et u
0[st^ rt+1(t+1)]^ rt+1(t+1): (5)
At the time the problem is solved agents need to form expectations regarding the
future realization of the rate of return rt+1(t+1), which implies forming expectations
on the probability distribution over the shock t+1. This is so because in this model
the probability distribution over  is determined endogenously by the combined ac-
tion of savers and rms through the eect of the capital accumulation externality.
In other words, agents know that when they choose optimal savings, they are also
aecting indirectly the determination of pt+1.14
As is customary in this literature, we restrict our analysis to the class of rational,
self-fullling expectations equilibria. In these type of equilibria agents make decisions
based on expectations that will be conrmed ex-post correct, in every state of nature.
Such an equilibrium (if it exists) is characterized as follows.15 Given the wage income
!t, recalling the expression for p in (1), substituting in (5) for ^ rt+1 the expression for
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kt+1 = st: (7)
pt+1 = p(kt+1): (8)
The following proposition establishes sucient conditions for the uniqueness of a
self-fullling equilibrium.
Proposition 1 Assume that the capital income, sf0(s), is non-decreasing in s in
all states of nature. In addition, assume that the ratio of the marginal utility in
the \good" state of nature and the \bad" state of nature does not exceed 
L.M o r e
14In standard stochastic models of growth the random shock aecting production is either assumed
to be drawn from an exogenous, xed distribution of probabilities (see, for example, Brock and
Mirman [14], Mirman and Zilcha [28], Zilcha [40], Wang [41], Bertocchi [11] or generated by an
exogenous Markov process (see Due et al. [17], Wang [42]).
15The underlying proof strategy is based on Wang [41]. Wang has established the conditions for
the existence and uniqueness of equilibria in a stochastic OLG model. However, my results dier














The result of Proposition 1 highlights the potential emergence of coordination fail-
ure and consequent equilibrium indeterminacy. While condition (9) is also the one
required in a model where the randomness is exogenous (see Wang [41]),16 the addi-
tional condition (10) is needed because there is a `strategic complementarity' between
the private return on savings and the aggregate capital stock. If the marginal utility
in the two states of nature is approximately equal (making their ratio close to one,
hence larger than L), multiple levels of savings will result optimal. Given the as-
sumption of strict concavity of the utility function, the pace at which the marginal
utility decreases is determined by the degree of risk aversion. High degree of risk
aversion means that the curvature of the utility function changes quickly. Therefore,
condition (10) suggests that the likelihood of equilibrium indeterminacy is higher
when agents are relatively risk tolerant. The intuition is that an agent perceives that
if everybody else is saving a high amount, p will result high and consequently he
should also choose to save a high amount. The opposite is instead true if he perceives
that everybody else is saving a small amount. This can be seen as equivalent to facing
a lottery on the realization of future income. When agents are risk tolerant (low risk
aversion), they may be willing to `bet' on what other agents will do. In such a case




the utility maximization problem. On the other hand, in a suciently risk averse
16It says that the elasticity of substitution (in absolute value) exceeds the labor's share of output.
For example, a CES production function with elasticity of substitution greater or equal than one
(in absolute value) satises this condition.
10world, agents will not be inclined to bet on what everybody else's decision might be,
and this will be more likely to result in a unique optimal decision level of savings.17
This example of coordination failure is peculiar to the model because of the postu-
lated endogenous nature of aggregate risk in production. The predicted dynamics of
identical economies subject to this problem is that one economy could build on a his-
tory of low levels of savings and remain trapped in such a scenario, while the other one
with a history of high participation in the capital market could be expected to con-
verge to a long-run equilibrium with high levels of capital accumulation. In addition,
switches of beliefs over time may cause ranking reversal among identical economies,
which identies the patterns of intra-distribution mobility previously described.
A rst plausible case of divergent dynamics among otherwise identical economies
is therefore identied by the model and it is shown to depend on the degree of risk
aversion exhibited by agents' preferences.
3.2 The dynamic evolution in the absence of indeterminacy
The existence of equilibrium indeterminacy in models of growth, and its recognition as
a plausible explanation for club convergence, has been the focus of recent analysis by
Benhabib and Gali [9]. While aware of the importance of this result, one should also
highlight the diculties associated with the econometric identication of equilibrium
indeterminacy. In addition, it is easy to show that in the case, for example, of
CRRA preferences, indeterminacy arises in this model if the coecient of relative
risk aversion is strictly less than one. Although there does not seem to be agreement
on the exact empirical magnitude of such coecient, this is customarily considered
to be larger than one (e.g. Barsky et al. [6]).
Therefore, I will proceed throughout the rest of the paper assuming that conditions
(9) and (10) hold. Even under this optimistic scenario, club convergence can still be
generated.
Under conditions (9) and (10), for any !t(t) > 0, agents at time t choose a
unique s
t such that the realization of outcome at time t + 1 will be exactly
17In sum, this is analogous to stating the preference of a risk averse agent for a certainty equivalent









t+1 with probability 1 − p
t+1(s
t)
Let us now dene the dynamic equilibrium path for this economy.
Denition 1 A dynamic equilibrium is a stochastic sequence fk
tg1
t=0 with initial con-
dition k0 > 0 which depends on the history of the realizations of the random variable
t = f0;1;:::;tg such that the optimal plans of consumption and production are
satised in every period.
From Proposition 1, st is uniquely dened as a function of kt and t. Hence, given the
equilibrium condition in the capital market, equation (7), there exists a well dened,
single valued function, , such that
kt+1 = ( kt;t): (11)
The expression (11) is a rst-order, stochastic, dierence equation, fully characterizing
the dynamic equilibrium of the economy.
Graphically, the dynamic evolution of (11) could be represented as in Figure 1.18
In this picture H  (kt;H) represents the dynamic evolution of the capital stock
if the realization of the shock were H at any time t. Equivalently we can dene
L  (kt;L). The values ka and kb are the xed points corresponding to the two
trajectories. The set [ka;k b] is called a stable set for the capital stock.
3.3 Multiplicity of stable sets
It is well known that, even with strong restrictions on preferences and technology, in
an overlapping generations model it is plausible to have scenarios where H and L
show a multiplicity of xed points, or cases with no xed points at all. Figure 2 and 3
illustrate these two alternative cases. Perhaps also interesting is that in the presence
of multiple stable sets, the dynamic system implies a set of initial conditions for which
18It can easily be shown that @=@kt>0, which assures that the phase diagram of kt+1 against kt
is upward sloping.
12indeterminacy arises (a dierent kind of indeterminacy from the one highlighted in
section 3.1). In Figure 2 this is true for any k 2 [kc;k d]:19 However, the model proceeds
maintaining the focus on the case where H and L each have only one xed point.
Even in the case of a unique stable set, a broad class of distinct long-run equilibria
will be identied.
4 Stationary equilibria
In order to obtain long-run predictions on the evolution of the economy, we need to
analyze the steady-state conditions of the model. However, in a stochastic model we
cannot dene a steady state as a single value of the capital stock, but rather as a
probability distribution over the capital stock that remains stationary over time: if we
cannot predict whether in the long run the capital stock will assume a specic value,
~ k, we can nevertheless state what is the probability that, in the long run, k = ~ k.
Let us denote with t the probability distribution over kt, i.e. t(B)=Prfkt 2 Bg
for all B 2 R+.
Denition 2 A probability distribution  is a stationary probability distribution if
it is the probability distribution over kt, for all t. That is, t !  as t !1 .
Thus, the stochastic analogue of a steady-state equilibrium in a deterministic
framework is as follows.
Denition 3 A stationary equilibrium for the stochastic process kt+1 = ( kt;t)
is a stationary probability distribution over the capital stock k on R+.
Proposition 2 If conditions in Proposition 1 hold and the stable set is dened over
the interval [ka;k b], then there is a unique stationary probability distribution over
[ka;k b].
Proof. This is an application of Theorem 12.12 in Stokey and Lucas [39].
19Given the restrictions on preferences and technologies, global contraction, multiplicity (and the
possible indeterminacy) cannot emerge in the set up chosen by Acemoglu and Zilibotti.
13Referring to Figure 1 we see that for any initial condition k0 > 0 the capital stock
will ﬂuctuate between the boundaries H and L, but once in [ka;k b] it will stay
there for ever. As t !1 , Prfk 2 [ka;k b]g = 1 and there is a unique stationary
distribution  measuring the probability that k = ~ k; 8 ~ k 2 [ka;k b].
4.1 Economic interpretation of the stable set
The features of the long-run equilibrium are determined by the characteristics of .
The analysis of  becomes especially interesting if we think of the stable set [ka;k b]
in the following fashion: the neighborhood of ka can be considered as a poverty region,
where the economy will stagnate if L recurs often. In contrast, the neighborhood
of kb can be considered as a developed region that is reached by the economy if the
adverse shock does not occur over time.20 Under this interpretation it should then
be clear that the long run will be qualitatively very dierent depending on whether
 is characterized by a high concentration of mass on the upper or the lower end of
the support.
In standard models of stochastic growth this would not be an interesting argument
because the randomness in production, which ultimately determines the form of the
stationary distribution, is exogenously imposed. But in this model the randomness
is the result of an endogenous interaction between savers and rms. Thus, even
in the case where an economy can converge to a unique stable set, substantially
dierent long-run patterns can be observed. The identication of this class of dynamic
equilibria is the focus of the following three sub-sections.
4.2 Liberating Prometheus forever
The rst pattern to identify is the one where, in fact, the stable set degenerates into
one point, kb. Recall that, by assumption, there exists a value of k, dened as  k<1,
such that p(k)=1 ; for all k   k: If an economy passes this threshold, the capital
accumulation externality is strong enough to assure complete insulation of production
from the occurrence of bad shocks. If this occurs, then k will converge with certainty
20Acemoglu and Zilibotti identify equilibrium points similar to ka and kb (in their notation, Kqssb
and Kqssg ) and they oer the same interpretation in terms of development regions.
14to kb and  will collapse on the upper end of the stable set.
The following Proposition describes formally the condition for the identication
of such long-run pattern.
Proposition 3 Consider the case described in Figure 4. The stable set is dened as
the interval [ka;k b].I f k  kb, then for any capital stock k0 > 0, the economy will
converge, with probability one, to a deterministic steady state equilibrium, k = kb.
Proof. When k  kb, then for any value of k0 > 0 a nite number of favorable shocks
is sucient for the capital stock to enter the range of values k  k.F r o mt h a tp o i n t
on, k will evolve according to kt+1 = ( kt;H) and will converge in the long run to
kb.
2
Proposition 3 describes a long-run equilibrium where the economy is perfectly
insulated by exogenous shocks. The transition, however, could be considerably long
and very painful: suppose that p(ka) is very low. Consequently, when k is close to
ka, there is a high probability to be hit by L, thus low probability to accumulate
capital and therefore high likelihood that L will occur again. Time persistency will
be observed when k is in a neighborhood of ka. However, with probability one, sooner
or later H will occur, capital will accumulate and the probability of H occurring
again will increase, thus making more and more likely that the economy will approach
the threshold  k:
What I have just described is actually the scenario identied in Acemoglu and
Zilibotti. Passing  k corresponds in their model to supply capital to the entire set of
projects, thus covering all possible states of nature. Prometheus will eventually be
unbound.21
However, in principle there does not seem to be a particular reason to believe
that an economy can ever grow enough to reach the threshold  k: Whether  k
7 kb is a
condition depending on the primitives of the economy, and we may not have sucient
`a prioris' to claim that the scenario depicted in Proposition 3 holds unconditionally.
In fact, if  k  kb were a general condition, we should expect all economies to be
21Although he will not be unbound by chance, since{as just mentioned{the probability that k
grows larger than  k is equal to one. Of course, chance matters for the actual timing of the transition
process.
15joining the club of the most developed countries, and once there, to exhibit a very
low degree of output variability. But this is a too strong implication in the light of
the club convergence patterns observed in reality.
The long-run equilibrium described in Proposition 3 should therefore be considered
only as a special case of a more general set of long-run equilibria, distinct from each
other by the shape of the stationary distribution : According to the denition of a
stationary equilibrium, the economy is in fact in a stable, long-run equilibrium even
if  is not collapsed on the upper bound of the support.22
How can we characterize the long run in this more general case? If  k>k b;
then even a long, repeated sequence of lucky draws will not allow the economy to
become totally insulated from production risk. The intuition is that, depending on
the specic parameterization of preferences and technology (recall we are working
purposefully with the most general functional forms restrictions), agents may never
optimally save enough to allow an accumulated capital stock larger than  k: This more
general scenario can be formally described as follows.
Proposition 4 If k>k b then for any value of k0 > 0, the long-run equilibrium is
characterized by perpetual ﬂuctuation in the stable set [ka;k b].
Proof. The proof follows from a brief inspection of Figure 5.
Thus, under condition in Proposition 4, Prometheus is destined to be bound for
eternity. However, the characteristics of the long-run equilibrium (i.e., keeping the
metaphore, Prometheus' well being) will be very dierent depending on the shape of
the resulting stationary distribution .
4.3 Convergence to a unique neighborhood
Suppose, for example, that p(ka) is already substantially high and then it grows higher
a skg o e st okb.I nt h i sc a s e will be characterized by a high concentration of mass
toward the upper bound of the support. See Figure 6a.
22The choice for the title of this paper, in direct reference to Acemoglu and Zilibotti's, should now
be clear.
16If we look at a time-series prediction, an economy under this scenario will spend
most of its time in the developed region. The transition path is very similar to the one
highlighted in the previous sub-section. The main dierence is that this equilibrium
conguration is compatible with temporary, but not the least painful, reversals of
fortune.
In a cross-section interpretation, this result suggests convergence of countries to
a developed region and decreasing variability as capital increases, exactly as in the
case described in the previous section.
The opposite scenario could be generated if p(ka) is low and it is still low at p(kb).
In this case  will be characterized by a concentration of mass toward the lower
bound of the support. See Figure 6b.
In a time-series interpretation, an economy should be observed, most of the time,
in the poverty region, although temporary spurts of growth may still be observed.
Cross-sectionally, this equilibrium pattern suggests a result of convergence to low
levels of income and the identication of a poverty trap (although, again, it is at least
temporarily possible to escape from the trap before Prometheus is bound again).
4.4 Club convergence
Finally, suppose that p(ka) is low but p(kb)is high. Under such a scenario, and
repeating the steps described above, the model implies time persistency when k is
either in the neighborhood of ka or kb.T h u s , b o t h ka and kb represent poles of
attraction for the capital stock in the long run. As Figure 7 shows, a \twin-peaks"
stationary distribution characterizes the long-run equilibrium.
In a cross-section interpretation, this is a legitimate identication of club con-
vergence. It accounts for the observation of identical economies, some clustered in
a poverty region and others clustered in the developed region. It is important to
highlight that such pattern emerges under the conditions for a unique stable set and
therefore a unique ergodic distribution. Consequently, as anticipated in introduction,
we do not need to invoke multiplicity of steady-state equilibria. In fact, we can now
move one step further in the interpretation of the results and argue that the empirical
prediction associated with multiple steady states (close initial conditions in per capita
output levels imply convergence to the same steady state) is not only ambiguous but
17actually misleading. As shown here, two identical economies, even with exactly the
same initial level of income per capita and both with the same stationary distribu-
tion featuring club convergence, can still be observed to have permanently divergent
capital levels.23
5 Numerical simulation
This section presents numerical simulations where specic functional forms were cho-
sen for the primitives of the economy. The simulation exercise helps visualizing the
stationary distribution of capital per capita, previously analyzed theoretically. In ad-
dition, it shows how the shape of the stationary distribution is aected by a change in
the characteristics of the p(k) function, thus adding normative value to the analysis.
This section also presents several robustness checks of the main results..
The utility function is assumed to be log-linear, U = log(ct)+E[(1 − )log(ct+1)]
and the production function is a Cobb-Douglas, f(kt)=k
t t: This choice rules out
equilibrium indeterminacy and assures that the economy converges to a unique stable
set.
Given this specic functions, the law of motion for the capital stock is kt+1 =
(1−)(1−)k
t t. The lower and upper ends of the stable set are ka =[ ( 1 −)(1−)L]
1
1−
and kb =[ ( 1 −)(1−)H]
1
1−:
The model was calibrated around Quah's transition matrix, shown in Table 1. If
xis world average income per-capita, the width of the support of the ergodic distribu-
tion in the Table is equal to 2x=0:25x =8 :Setting H =1 ; I selected L accordingly,
so that kb=ka =8 .
For every exercise I have run numerical simulations consisting of up to 100,000
iterations. For each iteration a random realization was drawn from the uniform
distribution over [0;1]. Starting from an assigned level of k, already in the stable
set, the simulation describes the random process of capital accumulation. In every
23More precisely, the two economies are clearly indistiguishable in a distributional sense. However,
if one takes a snapshot at any point in time or observes any nite interval of time (which is what
we do empirically), the economies may very well be observed having highly dierent levels of capital
per capita (one attracted in the poverty region while the other attracted in the developed region).
18iteration the shock  would take value L if the generated random number were
greater than the value of p, or value 1 otherwise. The value assigned to p in a specic
iteration depended on the chosen expression for p(k). For every simulation I have
then drawn the corresponding stationary distribution, approximated by a frequency
histogram. In order to maintain the parallel with Quah's empirical exercise, the
histograms were drawn choosing a 5 states grid.
In the rst part of the exercise p(k) was assumed to be a linear, increasing function.
Its slope and intercept were set so that the function would t closely the values of
the o-diagonal elements of Quah's transition matrix. Specically, in Table 1 the
probability of an economic setback for countries at the bottom of the ranking is 0:76,
while it is 0:05 for countries in the top cluster. Consequently, I set p(ka)=0 :24 and
p(kb)=0 :95: This yielded the function pt =0 :14 + 8:99  kt.
Setting  =0 :4a n d =0 :5 in the utility and production functions respectively,
I ran a rst simulation. The top part of Figure 8 shows the resulting stationary
distribution, exibiting bimodality with a clear thinning in the middle. Table 2 reports
in the rst row the numerical values for the simulated ergodic distribution and in the
second row the corresponding values from Quah's empirical ndings (the bottom row
in Table 1).
As a rst robustness check, I ran multiple independent simulations. The bottom
part of Figure 8 shows the contour plot of the corresponding tri-dimensional frequency
histogram, conrming the result of clustering and thinning in the middle. As an
alternative robustness check, I also ran simulations letting  vary in a plausible sub-
range in [0:4, 0:75], and  in [0:3, 0:7]. Table 3 and 4 reports the corresponding
ergodic distributions, showing a substantially unchanged result. It may be worthwhile
noticing that changes in , i.e. changes in agents preferences over savings for future
consumption, does not seem to have any eect on the shape of the distribution.
This may hint that indeed, as suggested in introduction, traditional policies aimed at
stimulating economic growth through an increase in savings rate may not be eective
unless there is also an improvement in insulation from production shocks.
In a second exercise, I ran simulations keeping the intercept of the p(k) function
constant and varying the slope. A specic parameterization of the function p(k)
captures the degree of market incompleteness and product dierentiation present in
the economy. In the model, a steeper p(k) function reﬂects a superior insulation
19from adverse shocks. As the stationary distributions in Figure 9 show, a relatively
ﬂat p(k) function generates unimodal convergence to the poverty region, while the
opposite is true with a relatively steep function. This exercise conrms the impact
that policies aimed at improving the insulation of the country from the occurrence of
adverse shocks would have on the pattern of long-run capital accumulation.
Additional robustness checks were done by running simulations assuming a con-
tinuous Beta distribution for  2 [L;H], rather than a binomial.24 An appropriate
change of the parameters of a Beta distribution shifts probability mass from the lower
to the upper extreme of the support. The conjectured endogenous relationship be-
tween the probability of an adverse shock and the level of capital accumulation can
be translated in a continuous framework by assuming the mean of the distribution as
an increasing function of k. Therefore, in the simulation would be drawn from a
dierent distribution, depending on the value of k in the stable set. Table 5 reports
the resulting ergodic distribution, which is still bimodal.
As a nal robustness check I have run simulations keeping p(k) constant. The
reason for this exercise was to verify whether one could actually obtain a multimodal
ergodic distribution within the standard stochastic growth model.
The simulations were run both with  drawn from a binomial distribution and
from a continuous Beta distribution. Table 6 reports the ergodic distributions for
the binomial case, for p =( 0 :2;0:4;0:5;0:6;0:8). Regardless of the value taken by p,
the distributions never come close to approximate one with twin peaks and a marked
thinning in the middle, such as the one observed empirically. Unimodality is also
clearly displayed in the case in which  was drawn from a Beta distribution, as it is
reported in Table 7.
6 Conclusions
The main question asked in economic development is whether poor countries catch up
with the rich. Empirical evidence suggests a negative answer, displaying a bimodal,
ergodic cross-country distribution of income per capita. The poor on average stay





0 xv−1(1−x)w−1dx; for 0  x  1: The
mean of the distribution is Mean(x)= v
v+w:
20poor, but it is still possible to observe intra-distribution mobility. How does growth
theory explain this empirical evidence? The standard neoclassical model, in its aug-
mented versions, do predict club convergence, but cannot explain economic miracles,
reversal of fortunes and growth disasters, due to the non-ergodic properties of the
predicted stationary distribution.
In the standard stochastic version of the neoclassical model, every distributional
characteristic is fully explained by nature, leaving little room for economics. In this
paper I have proposed a renement of the neoclassical, stochastic growth model,
in which the likelihood of adverse shocks to production is postulated to be higher
when an economy is in early stages of development. The assumption is justied
economically arguing that a developing country may suer from lack of diversication
and missing markets and institutions, which may leave the economy overly exposed to
the occurrence of adverse shocks. The empirical evidence from Quah [30]'s transition
matrix shown in Table 1 indeed conrms an intrinsic higher fragility of less developed
countries.
The paper contributes to the convergence debate by identifying the conditions
for the emergence of club convergence, without relying on multiplicity of steady
states. In addition, the predicted stationary distribution is ergodic, allowing for
intra-distribution mobility. The paper also identies conditions for equilibrium inde-
terminacy, considered as a possible alternative explanation for club convergence and
intra-distribution mobility.
In sum, this approach conrms the neoclassical model as an adequate framework
of analysis for economic development but it highlights uncertainty in production as a
fundamental second dimension. Capital accumulation per se is a necessary but not a
sucient condition for permanent development. In fact, the paper suggests that the
very denition of a developing country should be based on a metric that incorporates
risk considerations.
21Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1


















Existence and uniqueness of a self-fullling equilibrium requires that the left-hand
side of (12), (LHS), and the right-hand side, (RHS), have only one intersection.
Given the concavity of preferences, LHS is strictly increasing in st over [0;! t],
with LHS(0) > 0a n dLHS(!t)=+ 1.
Let us now focus on RHS.N o t et h a tkf0(k) <f(k) in all states of nature. Thus
it follows that lim
k!0
kf0(k) = 0. Therefore, RHS(0) = +1 and RHS(!t) > 0, which
assures the existence of at least one intersection between (LHS)a n d( RHS).
In order to obtain uniqueness it is sucient to establish conditions under which
(RHS) is strictly decreasing in st over [0;! t].







































This expression is strictly less than zero if conditions (9) and (10) in Proposition 1




Real GDP per capita relative to world average
23-year transition (1962-1985). Quah [30]
0-1/4 1/4-1/2 1/2-1 1-2 >2
0-1/4 0.76 0.12 0.12 0.0 0.0
1/4-1/2 0.52 0.31 0.10 0.07 0.0
1/2-1 0.09 0.20 0.46 0.26 0.0
1-2 0.0 0.0 0.24 0.53 0.24
>2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.05 0.95
Ergodic distribution 0.20 0.09 0.13 0.12 0.47
Results of the simulations (Table 2-7)
Table 2
Binomial :=0 :5;=0 :4:
pt =0 :14 + 8:99kt
0-1/4 1/4-1/2 1/2-1 1-2 >2
Simulated ergodic distribution 0.32 0.11 0.06 0.05 0.46
Quah's ergodic distribution 0.20 0.09 0.13 0.12 0.47
23Table 3
Simulated ergodic distribution.
Binomial :p t =0 :14 + 8:99kt
Varying  (=0.4).
0-1/4 1/4-1/2 1/2-1 1-2 >2
 =0 :4 0:26 0:03 0:04 0:03 0:62
 =0 :5 0:32 0:11 0:06 0:05 0:46
 =0 :6 0:37 0:14 0:08 0:05 0:36
 =0 :7 0:48 0:18 0:08 0:05 0:21
 =0 :75 0:49 0:20 0:09 0:05 0:15
Table 4
Simulated ergodic distribution.
Binomial :p t =0 :14 + 8:99kt
Varying  (=0.5).
0-1/4 1/4-1/2 1/2-1 1-2 >2
 =0 :3 0:31 0:11 0:06 0:04 0:47
 =0 :4 0:32 0:11 0:06 0:05 0:46
 =0 :5 0:30 0:11 0:05 0:05 0:49
 =0 :6 0:31 0:11 0:06 0:05 0:48
 =0 :7 0:31 0:11 0:06 0:05 0:48
24Table 5
Beta distributed : Mean() increasing in k:
 =0 :5;=0 :4:
0-1/4 1/4-1/2 1/2-1 1-2 >2
Simulated ergodic distribution 0:37 0:06 0:03 0:06 0:48
Stable set: k2 [0:01125;0:09].
For k 2 [0:01125;0:27]; drawn from Beta(2;6):
For k 2 [0:027;0:57]; drawn from Beta(6;6):
For k 2 [0:057;0:09]; drawn from Beta(6;2):
Table 6
Simulated ergodic distribution.
Binomial : Constant p:  =0 :5;=0 :4:
0-1/4 1/4-1/2 1/2-1 1-2 >2
p =0 :2 0:76 0:16 0:05 0:02 0:02
p =0 :4 0:49 0:23 0:14 0:08 0:04
p =0 :5 0:35 0:25 0:17 0:13 0:10
p =0 :6 0:23 0:24 0:19 0:16 0:18
p =0 :8 0:05 0:15 0:15 0:14 0:50
Table 7
Simulated ergodic distribution.
Beta distributed : Constant Mean():=0 :5;=0 :4:
0-1/4 1/4-1/2 1/2-1 1-2 >2
Beta(2;6) 0:78 0:22 0:08 0:00 0:00
Beta(6;6) 0:001 0:64 0:35 0:001 0:00
Beta(6;2) 0:00 0:01 0:29 0:65 0:05























[Ka, Kb]: Stable set
[Ke, Kf]: Stable set
K0Î [Kc, Kd]: Indeterminacy
Figure 2
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